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HOW CHAPTER 93A CONSUMERS LOST THEIR
DAY IN COURT: ONE LEGISLATIVE OPTION TO
LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD
I. INTRODUCTION
The zeitgeist of 1960s Massachusetts produced broad and powerful
consumer protection legislation known as the Massachusetts Consumer and
Business Protection Act (Chapter 93A).'
Inspired by federal law,
Massachusetts became the first state to pass such far-reaching consumer
protection legislation. 2 Chapter 93A provides consumers with a cause of

action when businesses engage in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices.,3

That phrase is now "heavy artillery" in Massachusetts and is the most
widely used statute in the Commonwealth's civil litigation. 4 The statute
aims to put consumers on a more level playing field with businesses who
supply needed goods and services.5
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) 6 is now a means for
large businesses to avoid facing consumers in the courtroom under statutes

1 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-11 (2007); Dwight E. Golann, Evolution of Chapter
93A. Nationaland Local Authority, in CHAPTER 93A RIGHTS AND REMEDIES §§ 1.1, 1.5, at 1-2, 6
(Hon. Margot G. Botsford ed., Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., 2d. 2007) (explaining evolution
and prevalence of Chapter 93A); Katerina S. Callahan, Note, Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 93A, Section 11: The Evolution of'the "Raised Eyebrow" Standard, 36 SUFFOLK U. L.
Rt V. 139, 139-46 (2002) (same).
2 Callahan. supra note 1, at 142-45 (describing Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and
progeny of state "little FTC" acts); Golann, supra note 1, §§ 1.1, 1.3, at 1, 3 (describing statutory
origin). This federal law established the Federal Trade Commission and made "unfair methods of
competition" unlawful. Callahan, supra note 1, at 142; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1995). The
language was amended to make "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce"
unlawsful. Id. § 45 Callahan, supra note 1, at 142. Chapter 93A's language is identical, making
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" by anyone engaged in "trade or commerce" unlawful.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2007).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2007).
4 Cassano v. Gogos, 480 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Golann. supra note 1,
§
1.1, at I (describing usage of Chapter 93A in Massachusetts); see also 52 MICHAEL C.
GILLERAN, THE LAW OF CHAPTER 93A § 1.1, at 1-6 (Mass. Prac. Series, 2d ed. 2008) (outlining
background of Chapter 93A).
S See G. Richard Shell, The Power to Punish: Authorit of Arbitrators to Award Multiple
'
Damages and Attorneys 'Fees, 72 MASS. L. REV. 26, 27 n.5 (1987) ("[M]erchants might abuse
their superior bargaining position in consumer transactions .... "); GILLERAN, supra note 4, §
1. 1, at 6 (describing Chapter 93A as "[creating] some haven in our heartless commercial life").
" 9U.S.C.§§ 1-14(1995).
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like Chapter 93A . Congress passed this legislation to overcome judicial
hostility towards arbitration agreements.' The FAA declares arbitration
clauses "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 This language
requires any court to stay judicial proceedings in favor of a valid arbitration
clause.' ° Unbeknownst to its drafters, the subsequent expansion of the

FAA's reach into state courts transformed it into a means to preempt
conflicting state laws providing for judicial or administrative remedies."
The FAA's preemptive power is in tension with Chapter 93A and other
consumer protection statutes designed to provide a day in open, public
court. 12

Where defendant businesses often pay for the arbitration of
consumer disputes, some believe that the arbitrators are more concerned
with maintaining their clients than reaching fair results. 3 Members of
Congress wish to address this concern by passing the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009.14 This bill would render pre-dispute arbitration agreements
unenforceable in consumer, employment, franchise and civil rights
7 See discussion intra Part III(illustrating how arbitration clauses preempt state legislation
providing non-arbitration remedies).
Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act s Interstate Commerce Requirement:
What's Letlfbr State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 389 (1992) (explaining FAA
origins).
9 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995).
1 Id. § 4 ("The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.").
I See intra Part 11.B (explaining how FAA can preempt state legislation).
12 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (acknowledging
conflict between FAA and state consumer protection statutes); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell,
220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing open, public nature of court compared to
arbitration); Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., Inc., 910 N.E.2d 317, 326 (Mass. 2009)
(recognizing conflict between Chapter 93A and FAA). "The United States Supreme Court
strongly favors arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. It has interpreted the FAA
expansively, nullifying most of the state laws and public policies that formerly excluded many
types of transactions, such as consumer and employment transactions, from arbitration." AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution qf Federal
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1421-22 (2008).
13 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S.931, 111 th Cong. § 2(4) (2009) (articulating influence
on arbitration companies); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong. § 2(4)
(2009) (same). This would not have been an issue under the original intent of the FAA, which
was to resolve disputes between merchants. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101-06 (2006) (articulating intended application of FAA).
14 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111 th Cong. (2009) (articulating changes to
FAA); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (same); see also infra
note 177 and accompanying text (evidencing ninety-five cosponsors for 2007 version).
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disputes.'
This revision would prevent businesses from utilizing
arbitration clauses buried in sales agreements to insulate themselves from
litigating statutory consumer claims in open court. ' Consumers would
have a meaningful choice and could still agree to use cost-effective,
efficient arbitration to resolve their disputes after they arose.'"
This
legislation would protect consumers from binding boilerplate arbitration
clauses that were not the product of fair and equal bargains."
It.LEGISLATION TO HELP BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS
A. The FederalArbitrationAct of 1925
Common law hostility towards arbitration was no secret.19 Courts
considered it a threat to their dispute-resolving authority, especially predispute agreements that promised to cut courts out from the beginning.20
Some common law jurisdictions considered such agreements revocable by
either party up until an award .2
Arguing for freedom to contract,

15 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111 th Cong. § 3 (2009) (nullifying pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in these types of disputes). But see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R.
1020, 111 th Cong. § 4 (2009) (excluding civil rights claims).
16 Moses, supra note 13, at 155 ("The new FAA has substantially reduced access to the court
system, particularly for consumers, workers, and those with little economic power. Any ...
[business] can prevent those with less economic power from ever having access to court to hold
them accountable.") (fbotnote omitted).
17 See injra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining how bill would change law).
18 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 11 lth Cong. § 2 (2009) (explaining problem
"between parties of greatly disparate economic power"); see also Bruhl, supra note 12, at 1422
(describing boilerplate provisions for "consumers or employees who have signed nonnegotiated
arbitration agreements embedded in standard-form contracts"); Recent Proposed Legislation,
Arhitration -- Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for
Consuomers, Emplovees, and Franchisees. -- Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th
Cong. (2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2264 (2008) [hereinafter Congress Considers Bill]
(describing lack of meaningful choice for consumers due to unequal bargaining power).
19 See Strickland, supra note 8. at 389 (explaining common law hostility to arbitration);
Congress Considers Bill, supra note 18, at 2262 (noting historical suspicion of arbitration). But
see Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enflbrcement of Predispute Arbitration
Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OttlO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 249, 272-78 (2003) (suggesting
that common law hostility to arbitration is a fallacy). Of course, arbitration is substantially older
than the common law. See I Kings 3:16-28.
20 See Strickland, supra note 8, at 389 (noting increased judicial suspicion of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements compared to similar post-dispute agreements).
21 See Moses, supra note 13. at 10 1-13 (explaining common law approach to arbitration); see
also Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. RE'. 1305, 1309 (1985) ("This treatment of arbitration began in the seventeenth
century, when English courts analogized the parties' appointment of an arbitrator to an agency,
revocable at the will of either principal, rather than to a contract.").
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disaffected business interests sought to resolve commercial disputes
privately.- They lobbied Congress to help assure them that they would be
able to arbitrate disputes by agreeing to do so ahead of time.
24
Congress adopted the FAA in 1925 as a nod to these concerns. In
declaring arbitration agreements "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,"
Congress lifted Section Two's language from a 1920 New York statute
designed to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements between
merchants.2 5 However, Congress drafted the FAA to apply in any dispute
"involving commerce., 26 Section Three required a court to stay any
judicial proceeding upon either party presenting a valid arbitration clause.
and privately outside of the
Enforcing contracts to resolve disputes quickly
28

courtroom became a clear federal policy.

The FAA's language was ambiguous as to whether it applied to
both diversity and federal question jurisdiction and whether it applied in

22 Leroy & Feuille, supra note 19, at 279 ("Congress's main concern was with businesses
who wanted freedom to enter into contracts to resolve their commercial disputes privately.");
Strickland, supra note 8, at 389-90 (noting "pressure from business interests" to enforce
arbitration agreements); see also Moses, supra note 13, at 101-13 (explaining full history of
FAA).
23 See Strickland, supra note 8, at 389-90 (describing business interests' hopes for FAA). At
the time, businesses were using arbitration to privately resolve disputes with other businesses.
Moses, supra note 13, at 101.
24 Congress Considers Bill, supra note 18, at 2262 (describing FAA origins); Robert 0.
Sheridan, Note, All Almost Quiet on the Expanded Review Front: Supreme Court Rejects
Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 93,
96 (2008) (explaining congressional intent behind FAA); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1995)
(codifying FAA).
25 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995); Moses, supra note 13, at 101 (explaining FAA's history). The
New York Assembly aimed to enforce these clauses in commercial contracts. Id. at 108.
Subsequent revision to the 1920 New York statute omitted the three-word phrase used in the
FAA. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 1998). Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are
enforced whether free-standing or a clause to a contract. Bruhl, supra note 12, at 1426.
26 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995) (including maritime transactions). Congress exerted this degree of
federal control over state contract law using Commerce Clause power and the effect-oncommerce rationale. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24
(1942) (establishing effect-on-commerce rationale for federal commerce power).
27 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1995) (establishing court procedure for handling valid arbitration clause).
28 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) ("[The FAA's] purpose
was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983) ("Congress's clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, [is] to move
the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
possible."). The FAA reserved a court's right to strike down an arbitration agreement uinder
contract or equity principles. See Shell, supra note 5, at 28; see also Feeney v. Dell. Inc., 908
N.E.2d 753, 767-69 (Mass. 2009) (using public policy exception to restrain FAA in Chapter 93A
class action).
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state courts at all:.2) Legal scholars of the 1920s believed that the FAA
applied to both types of subject matter jurisdiction, but only in federal
courts."' Swif' v. Tyson,3 then-existing Supreme Court precedent giving
federal courts the power to develop federal common law, undoubtedly
shaped their thinking.- These legal minds viewed the FAA as part of
federal contract law, but subject matter jurisdiction needed reexamination
after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 33 That decision ended the era of
federal common law and vitiated the rationale for applying the FAA in
diversity cases. 4 Continued inapplicability in state courts would leave the
FAA only enforcing agreements in federal question disputes.35
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc.,36 the
Supreme Court first addressed the FAA's post-Erie diversity question.3 7 In
this 1956 case, a federal district court and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed over whether an arbitrator could interpret a pre-dispute
arbitration clause in an employment contract based on Vermont law. 3s The
Supreme Court held that Section Two of the FAA did not apply because the
employment contract did not "[involve] commerce." 39 The Court was able
to avoid deciding whether the FAA applied in diversity cases after Erie
because only Section Two agreements required Section Three stays.40
29 Hirshman, supra note 21, at 1312-18 (articulating FAA's unclear scope); Strickland, supra

note 8,at 391 (explaining early questions of FAA applicability); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32
(1995) (codifying federal question and diversity subject matter jurisdiction).
30 Strickland, supra note 8, at 391 (explaining prevailing early view of FAA). The scope of
federal commerce power was also much narrower at the time. Bruhl, supra note 12, at 1428.
_, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32 Id. at 12 (articulating state law did not bind federal courts); Hirshman, supra note 21, at
1314 (explaining federal common law era).
33 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts were bound by state law in diversity
cases); Strickland, supra note 8, at 391 (describing scholarly view of pre-Erie FAA).
34 Strickland, supra note 8, at 392 (explaining Erie decision's effect on FAA). Professor
Strickland explained why Erie threatened diversity jurisdiction for the FAA: "Erie ended the
power of federal courts to make substantive rules of decision in diversity cases, and cast doubt on
Congress' power to do so. If the FAA were deemed to regulate substantive contract rights,
therefore, Erie arguably precluded its application in diversity cases." Id. (footnote omitted).
35 Moses, supra note 13, at 114-23 (writing on "the Post-Erie Dilemma"); see also Hirshman,
sup)ra note 21. at 1318-24 (articulating how Erie changed scope of FAA).
3, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
37 See id. at 200-02 (addressing FAA applicability in diversity case); see also Moses, sipi-a
note 13, at 115 (discussing Supreme Court's post-Erie dilemma).
39 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202 ("The question remains whether, apart from the [FAA], a
provision of a contract providing for arbitration is enforceable in a diversity case.").
; /d.at 200-01 ("There is no showing that petitioner while performing his duties under the
employment contract was working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was
engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our decisions.").
40 Id.at 203-05 (holding FAA did not apply). The Court was able to avoid the difficult
question:
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Justice Frankfurter's concurrence speculated on the potential trouble that
lay ahead when he wrote, "avoidance of the constitutional question [of
preemption] is for me sufficiently compelling to lead to a construction of
the [FAA] as not applicable to diversity cases.'
Eleven years later, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.,42 the Supreme Court again considered the FAA in a
diversity case; however, unlike in Bernhardt, the Court could not avoid the
constitutional question that worried Justice Frankfurter in 1956. 43 The
Prima Paint dispute arose out of a contract for the sale of paint,
unquestionably "involving commerce," and the Court invoked the FAA to
affirm a stay for arbitration under New York contract law. 44 Justice Fortas
defended the decision as not making federal substantive contract law in a
diversity case, which would have violated Erie.45 Instead, the FAA was a
regulation of interstate commerce, applying to diversity cases through the
Commerce Clause.4 6
Prima Paint meant that the FAA applied in all federal cases,
regardless of how they got into federal court.4 7 Still, Erie required
arbitration agreement interpretation under state law. 48 The combination of
Prima Paint and Erie could mean that the FAA was enforceable in state
courts, which would allow it to preempt state law.49 Justice Black's Prima
Paint dissent echoed Justice Frankfurter's concerns in 1956, as he lamented

The Supreme Court interpreted the FAA in such a way [in Bernhardt] as to avoid
deciding the difficult issues surrounding the application of Eric to the FAA. The Court
ruled that section 3 of the FAA ... applies only to arbitration agreements governed by
Since the contract before the Court [in Bernhardt] did not involve a
section 2 ....
maritime transaction nor interstate commerce, the FAA was inapplicable by its own
terms. The Court interpreted the statute this way expressly to avoid deciding whether
applicationof the FAA in a diversity case was unconstitutionalunder Erie.
Strickland, supra note 8, at 394 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
41 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
43 Compare id. at 401 (describing issue before Court), with Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 208
(Frankfurter, J. concurring) (warning of trouble ahead for the FAA); see also Moses, supra note
13, at 116 ('[T]he Court faced that question head-on in Prima Paint.").
44 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401, 406-07 (affirming district court's ruling by reasoning
contract within FAA's scope).
45 Id. at 405 ("The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion
federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity cases.").
46 Id. (explaining mechanics and reach of FAA).
47 See Moses, supra note 13, at 122 (explaining reach of FAA as of 1967); Strickland, supra
note 8, at 395 (describing FAA post-PrimaPaint).
48 Strickland, supra note 8, at 395-96 (explaining impact of Erie on federal arbitration law).
49 Id. (explaining potential reach of FAA in 1967).
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that holding the FAA to be a regulation of interstate commerce would
require application in state courts and preemption of state law. 0 After the
decision came down, various state courts cited Prima Paint and started
applying the FAA.51 The 1967 Prima Paint decision coincided with
Massachusetts' enactment of Chapter 93A, which made it the first state to
give aggrieved consumers a statutory right to go to court.52
B. The Massachusetts Consumer and Business ProtectionAct of 1967
At common law, proving elements such as intent, reliance and
privity often stood in the way of recovery for aggrieved consumers.' 3 The
law paid no attention to their disparate bargaining power because the
prevailing "laissez-faire" economic theory suggested that market forces
would determine the optimal level of respect for them. 54 Massachusetts
was especially severe because the Commonwealth is a non-punitive
damages jurisdiction, making even the most egregious examples of tortious
consumer exploitation result in an award of no more than actual economic

o Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 424-25 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black opined:
The Court here does not hold today ...that the body of federal substantive law created
by federal judges under the [FAA] is required to be applied by state courts. A holding
to that effect which the Court seems to leave up in the air - would flout the intention
of the framers of the [FAA]. Yet under this Court's opinion today - that the [FAA]
supplies not only the remedy of enforcement but a body of federal doctrines to
determine the validity of an arbitration agreement - failure to make the [FAA]
applicable in state courts would give rise to 'forum shopping' and an unconstitutional
discrimination that both Erie and Bernhardt were designed to eliminate. These
problems are greatlv reduced if the [FAA] is limited, as it should be, to its proper
scope. the mere enforcement infederal courts ot'valid arbitration agreements.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

] Hirshman. supra note 21, at 1326 ("[A] substantial number of state courts held
that they
were bound to apply the FAA."); see also, e.g.,
Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 239
S.E.2d 647, 649-52 (S.C. 1977) (applying FAA in South Carolina state court); Miller v. Puritan
Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234, 238-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (applying FAA in Texas state
court); Allison v. Medicab Int'l., Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 381-83 (Wash. 1979) (applying FAA in
Washington state court).
52 Compare Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395 (deciding case in 1967), with Callahan, supra note
1,at 144 (describing passage of Chapter 93A in 1967).
53 Golann, supra note 1,§ 1.3, at 3 (describing common law consumer remedies); see also
GILL-RAN. supra note 4, § 1.1, at 1-6 (articulating limitations of common law remedies);
Callahan, supra note 1,at 141 (describing pre-Chapter 93A era).
4 Callahan. supra note 1, at 141-42 (describing "laissez-faire" economic theory's
justification for not further protecting consumers). The idea was to allow the market to determine
the optimal treatment of consumers without considering the unequal bargaining power between
the parties. Id.at 142; see also GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 2-3 (articulating "laissez-faire"
theory on consumer protection).
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loss. 55 Additionally, successful consumer
plaintiffs would still have to pay
56

for their own attorney, fees and costs.

As the United States industrialized and suburbanized, consumers

became a powerful voice for reforming an out-of-touch "laissez-faire"
approach). As early as the turn of the twentieth century, courts outside
Massachusetts started awarding punitive damages to consumers for
intentional torts.58 On the legislative side, Congress passed the Federal
Trade Commission Act in 1914 (FTC Act). 59 The statute made "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" unlawful, and it gave
the Federal Trade Commission authority to independently police the
marketplace. 60 The consumer class continued to expand in the post-World
War II economic boom, and states considered passing their own consumer
protection legislation.61 States referred to these analogous statutes as "little
FTC" acts.62

In 1967, Massachusetts became the first state to pass such
legislation and codified its "little FTC" under Chapter 93A of the

Massachusetts General Laws.6 3 Chapter 93A created a statutory cause of
action for consumers, which ended their reliance on difficult to prove tort
and contract theories.64 The focus shifted from discerning a defendant's
bad motives or the nature of the relationship to protecting consumers by

55 See GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 2 n.2 (quoting Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28
N.E. 1, 5 (1891) (showing origin of Massachusetts' rule against punitive damages); Shell, supra
note 5, at 28 (describing absence of punitive damages in Massachusetts).
5( GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 1-4 (describing consumer restraints prior to Chapter
93A).
57 Id. § 1.1, at 1-6 (explaining transition away from "laissez-faire"). Gilleran also credits the
Progressive Era and the decline of legal formalism for this transition. Id.
58 Callahan, supra note 1, at 142 ("Gradually, a more interventionist approach replaced the
laissez-faire attitude ....
First, in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century,
courts began awarding multiple damages for intentional deceit in the marketplace.") (footnote
omitted).
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1995); Callahan, supra note 1, at 142 (explaining FTC Act origins).
60 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45 (1995) (establishing Federal Trade Commission and making such
actions unlawful). The statute was part of the trust-busting era. See Callahan, supra note 1, at
142; see also sources cited supra note 2 (explaining evolution of FTC Act language).
61 GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 4 (explaining growth of consumer class following World
War 11); Callahan, supra note 1, at 142 (explaining states' contemplation of consumer
legislation).
62 Callahan, supra note 1, at 142 (describing enactment of "little FTC" acts by states).
Golann, supra note 1, § 1.3, at 3 (describing FTC Act-based state consumer statutes).
63 Golann, supra note 1, § 1.3, at 3 (describing Chapter 93A history); see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-11 (2007) (codifying Chapter 93A).
64 GILLERAN, supra note 4, at § 1.1, at 5-6 (explaining departure from common law with
Chapter 93A).
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"attack[ing] marketplace abuses.'

Following the Commonwealth's lead,
all other states passed "little FTC" acts to protect consumers. 66
Chapter 93A became "potent weaponry" in Massachusetts..6 7 Just
like the FTC Act, Chapter 93A made "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
unlawful!" The initial version authorized only the Attorney General to sue
on behalf of consumers, which paralleled the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission.6 9 The drastic increase in litigation quickly overwhehned the
Attorney General's office, and the state legislature amended Chapter 93A
in 1969 to give consumers a private cause of action under Section Nine.70
Shortly after, the Massachusetts legislature granted businesses a cause of
action against other businesses, when it added Section Eleven in 1972.71
While Chapter 93A provided consumers and businesses with a new means
to address grievances in open court, neither section guaranteed the right to
7
a jury trial. 2
Chapter 93A claims represented a significant departure from
Massachusetts common law.73
After the addition of Section Nine,
consumer plaintiffs could recover multiple damages, attorney's fees and
costs. 7 4 For "knowing or willful" violations, courts had to double and
could treble the actual damages.75 In addition, demand letters became a
6

Golann, supra note I, § 1.3, at 3.

Chapter 93A was an attempt to provide "a more

equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to persons conducting business activities."
Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Mass. 1974).
66 Callahan, uqra note 1, at 142 (explaining impact of Chapter
93A nationally); see also
Shell, sipra note 5, at 26 n.2 (describing spread of "analogous" legislation).
67 Levings v. Forbes & Wallace Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149,
152 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
hX MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a) (2007) ("Unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptixe acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawlful.").
Callahan, supra note 1, at 145 (explaining initial Chapter 93A modeling after FTC Act).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2007) (establishing consumer cause of action); Golann,
supra note 1. § 1.3, at 4 (explaining 1969 amendment to provide consumers with private cause of
action).
71 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2007) (establishing private cause of action
for
businesses under Chapter 93A); Golann, supra note 1, § 1.3, at 4 (describing origin of § I I).
72 Town of Norwood v. Adams-Russell Co., Inc., 519 N.E.2d
253, 254 n.3 (Mass. 1988)
("There is no right to trial by jury for [Chapter 93A] actions ....
); Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d
674, 679 (Mass. 1983) ("In all, the equitable nature of the relief permitted and the silence of the
Legislature leads us to conclude that there is no right to a trial by jury for actions cognizable
under [Chapter 93A]."); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 (2007) (providing no right
to jury trial).
73 See ini/a notes 74-79 and accompanying text (explaining augmentation of consumer
rights).
14 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3A) (2007) ("Said damages may include
double or treble
damages, attorney's fees and costs .... "). The rationale is that Chapter 93A violations are "more
closely analogous to tort violations than to breaches of contract." Shell, supra note 5, at 34.
7S GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 11.9, at 544-67 (explaining statutory multiple damages);
Shell,
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prerequisite for consumers filing suit. 6

This requirement served several
purposes: to put offending businesses on notice; to provide information
about the nature of the claim; to encourage negotiations towards settlement;
and to act as a control on damages.77 Although defendants could avoid
multiple damages by making reasonable offers of settlement, bad faith
responses to demand letters could also give rise to multiple damage
liability. 78 Perhaps the most important departure from common law was
that aggrieved consumers79 no longer needed to address elements such as
intent, reliance or privity.
Consumer arbitration clauses were supposed to receive different
treatment in light of Chapter 93A.80 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts (SJC) made this distinction in 1982, when it decided
Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc."t Joseph Hannon sued
Aquatech Pools, Inc. (Aquatech) for breach of contract and a Chapter 93A
82
violation after a pool installation was more expensive than expected.
Aquatech counterclaimed for the money due and asked the court to stay the
proceedings under a broad, pre-dispute arbitration clause signed by Mr.
Hannon.13 The superior court stayed the case in favor of arbitration, and

supra note 5, at 27 (describing statutory remedies).
76 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2007) ("At least thirty days prior to the filing
of any
such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the
unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be mailed or delivered
to any prospective respondent."); see also Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge, Inc., 333 N.E.2d 202,
204 (Mass. 1975) (holding demand letter to be a prerequisite for § 9 claims). But see MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2007) (requiring no demand letter for claims under § I I).
7 See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 779 (Mass. 1975) (describing
function and purposes of demand letter).
78 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2007) (articulating grounds for multiple damages);
Whelihan v. Markowski, 638 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (awarding multiple
damages for bad faith settlement offer).
79 Golann. supra note 1,§ 1.3, at 3 (describing changes from common law).
80 See GILLERAN, sopra note 4, § 13.2, at 688 ("A different rule governs the enforceability of
arbitration clauses agreed to by § 9 consumer plaintiffs versus those agreed to by § II business
plaintiffs. A § 9 plaintiff will be able to avoid arbitration while a § Il plaintiff probably will not
be able to avoid arbitration."); see also Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d
182, 187-88 (Mass. 1990) (holding only § 11 rights can be waived).
l 434 N.E.2d 611,613 (Mass. 1982).
82 Id. at 612-13 (describing facts of case). Mr. Hannon alleged misrepresentations, "lowballing" and "commercial bribery." Id. Mr. Hannon signed Aquatech's "excavation approval
form" prior to commencing the work, which made him responsible for additional expenses
associated with the excavation and included a minimum $250 fee in the event Aquatech
encountered water. Id. at 614-15. Aquatech encountered water along with buried stumps while
excavating and substantial additional work was necessary to pump the water to complete the job.
I. at 615. Aquatech's S1,375.25 additional charge on top of the $7,000 contract price caused the
dispute. Id.
83 See id. at 613 (describing procedural background of case). The arbitration clause between
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the arbitrator awarded damages to Aquatech on their counterclaim without
Hannon even raising his Chapter 93A claim.8 4 After arbitration, Hannon
brought his claim in superior court, where Aquatech argued that he had
missed his chance by not raising the Chapter 93A claim in the arbitration. 5
Hannon pointed to part of Chapter 93A's Section Nine that read,
"[a]ny person entitled to bring an action under this section shall not be
required to initiate, pursue or exhaust any remedy established by any...
statute or the common law.",8 6 The SJC agreed and held, "consumers need
not submit to arbitration as a precondition to asserting their rights under
[Chapter 93A]. ' 7 The SJC further held that Hannon could still bring his
Chapter 93A claim in court, even after arbitration."8
As of 1982,
Massachusetts consumers could not be forced to arbitrate Chapter 93A
claims even with a pre-dispute arbitration clause. 9

Htannon and Aquatech read, "[i]n the event of a dispute arrising [sic] between the customer &
[Aquatech], the customer shall submit to arbitration by the Better Business Bureau of Mass.
before any legal action can be brought against [Aquatech]." Id at 614. As the case was in state
court, between two Massachusetts residents, Aquatech asked for the stay pursuant to the
Massachusetts Arbitration Act. Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2 (2007) (codifying
Massachusetts Arbitration Act).
84 Hannon, 434 N.E.2d at 613 (describing procedural background
of case).
iId. (describing trial level procedural arguments of dispute). Aquatech argued that only
Ilannon's claim for attorneys' fees remained. [d.
M ld. at 618 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(6) (2007)). The full text of
§ 9(6)
reads:
Any person entitled to bring an action under this section shall not be required to
initiate, pursue or exhaust any remedy established by any regulation, administrative
procedure, local, state or federal law or statute or the common law in order to bring an
action under this section or to obtain injunctive relief or recover damages or attorney's
fees or costs or other relief as provided in this section.
Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies shall not be a defense to any proceeding under this section,
except as provided in paragraph seven.
MASS. G[N. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(6) (2007).
X7 Hannon, 434 N.E.2d at 613 (describing holding
of case).
Ild. at 618-19 (holding Massachusetts Arbitration Act "permits a stay of [Chapter 93A]
actions only in certain limited circumstances not present here"). "While arbitration pursuant to a
contract does not fall neatly into the categories of remedies listed in [Chapter 93A § 9(6)], we
think it comprehended within either 'common law' or statutory remedies." Id.; see also Shell,
supra note 5, at 27 (referencing Hannon, "[t]he arbitrator's decision on the [Chapter 93A] claim
was a nullity").
GIt.-RAN,
t9
supra note 4, § 13.2, at 688 n. I (listing cases standing for this proposition); see
also Simas v. House of Cabinets, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 277, 282 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (holding § 9
claims are arbitrable at "election" of consumer).
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III. HOW ARBITRATION CLAUSES CAME TO PREEMPT
CONSUMER FORUM CHOICE
A. The Supreme Court's Expansion of the FederalArbitrationAct
By the early 1980s, the FAA enforced nearly all arbitration clauses
in federal court, but the Supreme Court had not directly confronted the
question of whether the statute reached state courts. 90 In 1984, the
Supreme Court finally answered this question in Southland Corp. v.

Keating.91 The issue was whether a California state statute, that invalidated
certain arbitration agreements "involving commerce," directly conflicted
with the FAA and therefore required preemption. 92

Southland Corp. (Southland) was the owner and franchisor of the
7-Eleven convenience store chain in California.9 3 The company assisted
franchisees with the ownership and operation of their own stores in
exchange for a fixed percentage of gross profits.9 4
Each franchise
agreement included a broadly-worded, pre-dispute arbitration clause. 95
Approximately 800 franchisees filed a class action against Southland in
California state court alleging breaches of contract and fiduciary duties,
misrepresentation and violation of the California Franchise Investment
Law.96 The California Supreme Court previously interpreted the franchise
statute to be capable of invalidating arbitration clauses in unlawful
franchise agreements.9 7
90 See discussion sapra Part Il.A (describing remaining question of FAA applicability in state
courts).
9' 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
9 Id. at 3 (explaining one issue before Court). The other issue was "whether arbitration
under the [FAA] is impaired when a class action structure is imposed on the process by the state
courts." Id.;
see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
229-40 (Foundation Press 2007) (1937) (describing preemption doctrine); sources cited infra
notes 105-08 and accompanying text (detailing constitutional doctrine of preemption).
93 Southland, 465 U.S. at 3 (describing facts of case).
94 Id.at 3-4 (describing facts of case). Franchisee assistance included using registered
trademarks, subleasing space directly from Southland, subsidizing financing inventory and
helping with advertising and marketing expenses. Id.
95 Id. at 4 (describing arbitration clause in all Southland franchising contracts). The
arbitration clause stated that, "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association ... and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof" Id.(alteration in original).
96 Id.(relaying background of case).
97 Id. at 10 (describing California precedent requiring judicial consideration of claims under
franchise statute); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (2006), invalidated by Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("Any condition, stipulation or
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any
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The California courts did not agree on whether the claim under the
franchise statute could go to the arbitrator along with the other claims. 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the FAA could
reach the state court.9 9 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, held
that the FAA conflicted and, therefore, preempted the California Franchise
Investment Law.I 00 The Chief Justice explained that PrimaPaint indicated
that the FAA was an exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, which "clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to
apply in state as well as federal courts."' 0 ' The opinion continued, "there
are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than
10 2
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.
Since the FAA was now federal substantive law, Section Two applied to
enforce an arbitration 1agreement
in either state or federal court if it
03
"[involved] commerce." '
By imposing the FAA on state courts, the Supreme Court
drastically expanded the preemptive effect of arbitration clauses on state
statutes providing for non-arbitration remedies. 0 4 Since the Constitution's

provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void.").
9 Southland, 465 U.S. at 4-5 (describing procedural history).

The trial court compelled
arbitration on all claims except the claim brought under the California Franchise Investment Law.
Id. at 4. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that § 2 of the FAA preempted any
arbitration clause invalidation by the state franchise statute. Id. at 5. The California Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court. Id.
99 hI at 3 (describing issue before Court). This was the remaining post-Erie
question. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
")( Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 ("So interpreted the California Franchise Investment Law
directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause.").
W i /d. at 12.
12 Id. The Supreme Court referenced Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint, which stated in
part:
Finally, there are clear indications in the legislative history that the Act was not
intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts or to provide an
independent federal -question basis for jurisdiction in federal courts apart from diversity
jurisdiction. The absence of both of these effects - which normally follow from
legislation of federal substantive law seems to militate against the view that Congress
was creating a body of federal substantive law.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
101 Hirshman, supra note 21, at 1307 (explaining Prima Paint "characterized the FAA
as
federal substantive law enacted pursuant to Congress' powers over interstate commerce and
admiralty"): see also Shell, supra note 5, at 26 n.3 ("The [FAA] is fully enforceable in both state
and federal courts in appropriate cases."). "[The FAA] creates a body of federal substantive law
establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate .
Moses H. Cone
Mem'l losp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1983).
104 Hirshman, supra note 21, at 1346 (explaining FAA's post-Southland reach into state
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Supremacy Clause makes federal law the "supreme Law of the Land," the
FAA will supersede conflicting state law under the constitutional doctrine
of preemption. 0 5 The Supreme Court recognizes both expressed and
implied preemption of state law.10 6 In the absence of specific language
superseding state law, implied preemption can occur where the federal
government chooses to occupy a particular field or where state law is in
conflict with federal law. 0 7 Implied conflict preemption occurs where
compliance with both laws would be impossible or where the state law
frustrates the federal law's purpose.10 8
Since Southland, the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on
implied conflict preemption to strike down state statutes that impair the
FAA. 0 9 The Supreme Court first relied on Southland and the FAA to
preempt a California labor statute that ignored pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in employee actions for lost wages.' 10 Then, in a 1995 case, AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,"' the Supreme Court struck down an12
Alabama statute making pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable.
The Alabama Supreme Court did not consider this contract between
Alabama homeowners and exterminators as one involving interstate

courts).
"The United States Supreme Court has encouraged this transformation through
expansive interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act." Bruhl, supra note 12, at 1420. The
Court has not been "'shyabout enforcing its pro-arbitration preferences." Id. at 1424.
'5 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.; see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 92, at 229 (explaining doctrine of preemption).
106 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) ( "It is well-established that within Constitutional limits Congress may
preempt state authority by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit preemptive language,
Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found .... ") (citation omitted).
107 Id. (explaining two forms of implied preemption).
1o Id. at 204 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (describing two types of implied
conflict preemption).
109 See sources cited in/ra notes 110-19, 127-31 and accompanying text (evidencing FAA's
preemption of conflicting state statutes).
1X See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-92 (1987) (explaining that FAA preempts state
law). The dispute arose between an employer and former employee, regarding commissions from
the sale of securities. Id. at 484. The relevant statute allowed the former employee to disregard
an arbitration clause in the employment contract if he was seeking lost wages. Id. at 486.
HI 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
112 Id. at 268 (holding state statute preempted by FAA).
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commerce."13 The Supreme Court found Alabama's reading too narrow,
holding instead that it would be "unnecessarily complicating
the law and
4
breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it.","
The Allied-Bruce holding arguably extends the FAA's reach as far
as the Commerce Clause permits.1 5 Critics of the FAA's expansion lament
this combined result of Erie, Prima Paint and Southland. 16 In the year
following Allied-Bruce, the Supreme Court struck down a Montana statute
that made arbitration clauses enforceable only by meeting certain limited
criteria."7 The FAA now preempts any state statute that attempts to limit
the enforceability of arbitration clauses."' Such state laws frustrate the
federal purpose of the FAA when they seek to limit the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration." 19
Even while expanding its reach, the Supreme Court expressed
concern for what a post-Southland FAA meant for consumers. 20 Because
113Id. at 269 (describing Alabama Supreme Court's reading of involving commerce in
FAA's § 2).
114Id. at 275.
See id. at 279 (describing congressional intent to pass, in the FAA, a law to "make
arbitration agreements universally enforceable"). Prior to Allied-Bruce, scholars were concerned
that the FAA would extend as far as the powerful Commerce Clause would permit. See
Strickland, supra note 8, at 412-16.
116See Moses, supra note 13, at 133-34 (articulating Court's misconstruction of FAA); see
also Strickland, supra note 8, at 391-97 (exploring evolution of FAA through Erie, Prima Paint
and Southland).
''7
See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682-89 (1996) (striking down
Montana state statute). The statute required arbitration clauses to be in capital letters, underlined
and on the first page of any contract to be enforceable. Id. at 684.
I11 See Moses, supra note 13, at 133-34 (articulating how misconstruction of FAA has left
little room for state legislation).
i1
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (holding states are limited to contractual doctrines in
invalidating arbitration clauses). Justice Breyer wrote:
What states may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic
terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The
[FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place
arbitration clauses on an unequal 'footing,' directly contrary to the [FAA 's] language
and Congress' intent.
Id. (emphasis added). "The 'goals and policies' of the FAA, this Court's precedent indicates, are
antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provisions ....
The State's prescription is thus inconsonant with, and is therefore preempted by, the federal law."
Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688; see also. e.g., id. (preempting Montana law with first-page
notice requirement for arbitration clauses); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511
(1974)) (describing purpose of FAA to put arbitration clauses on "same footing as other
contracts"); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding federal purpose behind the FAA
was "in unmistakable conflict" with California labor statute).
120 See sources cited in/ra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (evidencing judicial concern
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anything within the scope of the Commerce Clause could now be
preempted, one contract clause could potentially deprive consumers of their
right to go to court under state consumer protection statutes. 121 The AlliedBruce decision addressed this argument by contending that the FAA was
also consumer-minded because it reduced the financial burden of dispute
resolution.1 22 Justice O'Connor disagreed with that contention and wrote
separately to express her concern.1 23 Although she concurred with the
Court, she opined, "[t]he reading of § 2 adopted today will displace many
state statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers. 124 The displaced
state statutes 1are
presumably the "little FTC" acts, such as Massachusetts'
25
Chapter 93A.

The post-Southland FAA continues to impact plaintiffs by making
arbitration mandatory. 26 In a decision published in February 2008, the
Supreme Court addressed whether the FAA preempted a California
employment statute that provided exclusively for an administrative remedy
2
in Preston v. Ferrer.1
In reversing the California courts for following

for consumers); see also Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 996-99 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (expressing displeasure with Southland).
121 See Bruhl, supra note 12, at 1430-31 (explaining that full Commerce Clause scope for
FAA meant preemption of conflicting state consumer statutes).
122Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 280 ("We agree that Congress, when enacting this law, had the
needs of consumers, as well as others, in mind .... Indeed, arbitration's advantages often would
seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining about a product, who need a less expensive
alternative to litigation."). Justice Breyer opined:
In any event, § 2 gives States a method for protecting consumers against unfair
pressure to agree to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles
and they may invalidate an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."

Id. at 281 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). This statement refers to doctrines such as unconscionability
that courts have used with limited success to restrain the expanded FAA. See Bruhl, supra note
12, at 1436-43; see also Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 767-69 (Mass. 2009) (using public
policy exception to restrain FAA in Chapter 93A class action).
123 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (addressing need for uniform
standard, effect on consumers and following Southland).
124 Id. at 282.
125 See Moses, supra note 13, at 99, 101, 138-45 (including consumers in groups adversely
impacted by FAA's expansion); sources cited supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing
legislation analogous to Chapter 93A passed in all fifty states).
126 See cased cited infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (describing recent cases); see
also Press Release, Senator Russell Feingold, U.S. Senate, Feingold Introduces Consumer Justice
Legislation (April 29, 2009) (on file with author) (advocating for reform).
... 128 S. Ct. 978, 982-83 (2008) (presenting issue before Court). Preston sought legal fees
from Ferrer under a pre-dispute arbitration clause, but Ferrer argued the entire agreement was
invalid under the California Talent Agencies Act. Id. at 981-82. This statute gave exclusive
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their state statute over an arbitration clause, Justice Ginsburg wrote, "when
parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws
lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or
administrative, are superseded by the FAA., 12' The Court held that both
granting exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative agency and establishing
prerequisites to enforcement of arbitration clauses were specific conflicts
between that state law and the FAA. 129 In April 2009, the Court held, in 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,130 that employees could not bring their individual
age discrimination claims in court where their union's collective bargaining
agreement provided for arbitration of discrimination claims.' 3 1 The FAA's
power to negate forum choice is particularly alarming in situations
generally associated with disproportionate bargaining power, such as civil
rights, consumer, employment and franchise disputes.1 32 Among other
concerns, the private arbitration settings replace the public American
courts, allowing abuses of disparate bargaining power that result in
litigation to remain a secret.133

original jurisdiction to the state's Labor Commissioner. Id. at 982.
121 Id. at 981.
129 Id. at 985 (describing specific conflicts between FAA and California law).

Granting

exclusive jurisdiction with another body where the parties agreed to arbitrate was previously held
to conflict with the FAA. See Buckeye Check Cashing. Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446
(2006). In 1996, the Court held that prerequisites to enforcing arbitration agreements conflict
with the FAA. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
130 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
"' Id. at 1461, 1465 (explaining enforcement of provision). The clause plainly required
arbitration of all discrimination claims. See id. at 1461. The employees, however, argued that for
their union to bargain away their individual, non-economic statutory rights was "outside the
permissible scope of the collective-bargaining process." Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1464. Justice
Thomas wrote for the Court and responded, "[p]arties generally favor arbitration precisely
because of the economics of dispute resolution." Id.
132 See id. at 1465 (contracting away for civil rights claims); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson. 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995) (contracting away for consumer disputes); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (contracting away for employment
disputes); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (contracting away for franchise
disputes).
133 See. e-g.,
Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) ("People
who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on courts, they must accept the
openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable)
officials."); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(representing type of consumer exploitation that would remain secret in private arbitration); Press
Release, supra note 126 (explaining concerns with mandatory arbitration).
Openness is
fundamental to the American governmental design. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James
Madison).
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B. The Preemption of Chapter 93A Court Rights
After the SJC's 1982 Hannon decision, Massachusetts courts and
scholars believed that Chapter 93A consumers had the right to choose court
over arbitration for their claims. 34 This understanding of Chapter 93A
limits the enforcement of arbitration clauses against consumers.' 35 The
Hannon rule is that businesses cannot force consumer plaintiffs to exhaust
other remedies, such as enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
sales agreements."'
Therefore, consumer plaintiffs could avoid
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses for their Chapter 93A
claims. 37 It was clear, however, that Hannon did not extend to Section
Eleven claims, where both the plaintiff and defendant were engaged in
trade or commerce. 38 The only way that Chapter 93A consumers would

134See Gargano & Assocs., P.C. v. John Swider & Assocs., 770 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002) ("[A] consumer is under no obligation to exhaust other remedies, including
arbitration provisions provided by contract."); Simas v. House of Cabinets, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 277,
282 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001 ) (citing Hannon as standing for this proposition); Greenleaf Eng'g
& Constr. Co. v. Teradyne, Inc., 447 N.E.2d 9, 12 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (stating Hannon held
that "[Chapter 93A] precluded the issuance of a stay of court proceedings during arbitration in an
action under § 9 by a consumer"); William C. Athanas & Bruce A. Singal, De/enses and
Exemptions, in CHAPTER 93A RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 6.5.1, at 13 (Hon. Margot G. Botsford
ed., Mass. Continuing Legal Educ.. 2d ed. 2007) ("Consumers seeking relief under Section 9 are
not required to submit their claims to arbitration before filing suit, even if there is a contractual
arbitration clause in the parties' agreement.").
135See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (articulating SJC's Hannon decision on
Chapter 93A § 9(6)).
136 See Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611, 620 (Mass. 1982)
(holding in favor of the consumer). Justice Lynch wrote:
Nonetheless, the public policy expressed by the Legislature in [Chapter 93A] of
allowing consumers access to the courts to vindicate their rights, without first
exhausting other remedies, moves us to disallow recovery by Aquatech under the
contract for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in forcing Hannon into arbitration as
a precondition to asserting his rights under [Chapter 93A].

id. "The Supreme Judicial Court has held, however, that consumers seeking to assert rights under
Section 9 cannot be requiredto arbitrate their claims if they prefer a judicial forum."
note 5, at 27. Of course, they may still elect to do so. Id.: see also Canal
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187-88 (Mass. 1990) (holding only § II
waived).
137 GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 13.2, at 688 ("A § 9 [consumer] plaintiff will be

Shell, supra
Elec. Co. v.
rights can be

able to avoid
arbitration ....");Athanas & Singal, supra note 134, § 6.5.1, at 13 (citing Hannon for same
proposition); Shell, supra note 5, at 27 (describing consumer choice to arbitrate as voluntary
despite existence of arbitration clause).
138 See Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., 761 N.E.2d 482, 484-85 (Mass. 2002)
(evidencing no Hannon right under § 11); Schoenhardt v. Augustus Constr., Inc., 2008 WL
2277597, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. June 5, 2008) (evidencing Hannon applies only to § 9); see also
GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 13.2, at 688 ("A different rule governs the enforceability of arbitration
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not have a guaranteed judicial remedy was if they chose to foreclose that
remedy by agreeing to arbitrate after the dispute arose.I-;
Chapter 93A conflicts with the FAA by frustrating the purpose of
enforcing arbitration agreements.14 0 Congress passed the FAA to reduce
judicial hostility toward arbitration and to honor contractual agreements for
its use. 4' In passing the FAA, Congress made freedom to contract into
private dispute resolution a clear federal policy. 42 Once the Supreme
Court expanded the FAA into state courts with Southland, it effectively
neutralized any state statutes limiting the enforcement of arbitration
clauses.14 3 The only remaining restriction on the FAA's reach is the
"involving commerce" requirement; however, the interpretation of the
modem Commerce Clause in Allied-Bruce indicates that this is a weak
restraint at best. 44 Chapter 93A consumers would frustrate the FAA's
45
purpose by invoking Hannon, and arbitration would be mandatory.
clauses agreed to by § 9 consumer plaintiffs versus those agreed to by § I I business plaintiffs.");
Athanas & Singal, supra note 134, § 6.5, at 13 (pointing out "clear distinction between Section 9
and Section I I cases"); Shell, supra note 5, at 28 (acknowledging distinction between §§ 9 and
I).
13,) Conpare Simas, 757 N.E.2d at 282 (articulating Chapter 93A consumer's right to a
judicial remedy), with Gargano, 770 N.E.2d at 511 (holding arbitrator ruling on § 9 claim
forecloses same claim in court): see also GILLERAN, supra note 4, § 13.2, at 688-90 (evidencing
support for Hannon).
140 See infira notes 141-45 and accompanying text (describing Chapter 93A conflict with
FAA).
141 Moses H. Cone Mem'i Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983)
("Congress's clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, [is] to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute
out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible."): Congress Considers Bill,
supra note 18, at 2262 (describing FAA origins); Sheridan, supra note 24, at 96 (explaining
congressional intent behind FAA).
142 Allied-Bruce Terninix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (describing
enforcement of arbitration clauses as policy behind FAA); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) ("[The FAA's] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted
by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts.").
141 See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (striking down
Alabama statute making pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at
281 (holding states are limited to contractual doctrines in invalidating arbitration clauses): Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding federal purpose behind the FAA was "in
unmistakable conflict" with California labor statute).
144 See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 279 (describing the FAA's goal as to make arbitration
clauses "universally enforceable"); Strickland, supra note 8, at 412-16 (expressing pre-AlliedBruce concern that FAA would reach full extent of Commerce Clause). "With the Supreme
Court's encouragement. [the FAA] has grown into the broadly sweeping, muscular statute we
know today." Bruhl, supra note 12, at 1429.
145 See Doctor s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688 ("The 'goals and policies' of the
FAA . . . are
antithetical to [state law] threshold limitations specifically and solely on arbitration provisions.");
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (declaring anything that puts arbitration clauses "on an unequal
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The last hope for consumers' Hannon right came in Wolff v.
Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC;1 46 a case that presented an illustration of
the direct interplay between the Hannon decision and the FAA.1 47 The
Wolff family brought a Chapter 93A claim against their securities dealers
pertaining to the allocation of their shares in the initial public offering of
stock in Qwest Communications International, Inc. 4
This securities
transaction involved interstate commerce, and the court stayed the
proceedings under the FAA. 149 The court distinguished Hannon as
applying only to arbitration agreements involving wholly intrastate
commerce and enforced under the Massachusetts Arbitration Act."o "This
Court does not read Hannon ...as State law that can preclude arbitration
in a circumstance covered by the FAA."' 5'
In July of 2009, the SJC decisively extinguished the possibility of
any distinguishing between the two arbitration statutes. 152 In Warfield v.
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.,' 53 the SJC held that the
plaintiffs gender discrimination claim did not need to go to arbitration
because it fell outside the scope of the employment contract's arbitration
clause. 54 Justice Botsford's majority opinion stated that both arbitration
statutes applied and are to be treated substantially the same, which ran
contrary to the Wolff concept. 55 The SJC expunged any hope of the
Hannon rule surviving the FAA's expansion: "We recognize that where the
FAA applies, it would preempt a conflicting State law-one that might, for
example, bar arbitration or authorize a party to proceed in a judicial forum
regardless 56of the party's [sic] having entered into an agreement to
arbitrate.'

'footing,' [as] directly contrary to the [FAA's] language and Congress' intent."); GILLERAN,
supra note 4, § 13.2, at 688 (citing Hannon to allow consumers to avoid arbitration); Athanas &
Singal, supra note 134, § 6.5.1, at 13 ("Consumers seeking relief under Section 9 are not required
to submit their claims to arbitration before filing suit [under Hannon], even if there is a
contractual arbitration clause in the parties' agreement.").
146 2002 WL 31382606 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2002).
147 See id. at *2 (deciding between Hannon and FAA).
148 Wolff 2002 WL 31382606, at *1 (describing nature of dispute).
149 Id. at *2-3 (describing applicability of FAA).
150 See id. (describing holding).
The Massachusetts Arbitration Act is a version of the
Uniform Arbitration Act passed in many states. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, §§ 1-18 (2007).
' Wolff, 2002 WL 31382606, at *3.
152 See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (describing July 2009 SJC decision).
13 910 N.E.2d 317 (Mass. 2009).
154 Id. at 320 (explaining holding).
"' Id. at 322-23 (comparing Massachusetts Arbitration Act with FAA); Wol/j, 2002 WL
31382606, at *2-3 (attempting to keep Hannon for Massachusetts Arbitration Act).
156 Warfield, 910 N.E.2d at 326 n. 14.
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IV. THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009
The FAA's expansion led to a response on Capitol Hill from
Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin. 157 On July 12, 2007, Senator
Feingold first introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) of 2007,
which would have made all pre-dispute arbitration agreements
unenforceable in consumer, employment and franchise contracts.158 The
bill described the FAA as a statute originally designed to apply to two
commercial entities, but instead it "now extends to disputes between parties
of greatly disparate economic power, such as consumer[s].' 5 9 In studying
the issue, Congress found that consumers lack a choice when their
160
agreements with larger businesses include arbitration clauses.
Concurrently, Representative Henry Johnson Jr. of Georgia introduced
matching legislation in the House of Representatives. 161 Representative
Johnson argued that the bill "would not take arbitration off the table as an
alternative dispute resolution process, [but] it would simply
require that the
162
go.'
to
want
they
way
which
decide
to
able
be
parties
Those who view the current state of the law as an "Arbitration
Trap" praise the AFA. 163 Senator Feingold describes his bill as giving
citizens a "true choice" between arbitration and a traditional court
proceeding. 164 He argues that the bill addresses the "repeat players"
problem, where arbitrators are under pressure to favor client companies
who provide extensive, repeat and lucrative business. 165 Supporting this
157 Congress Considers Bill, supra note 18, at 2262 (describing Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007 and Senator Feingold's authorship).
151 Id. at 2264-65 (explaining AFA); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782,
11 Oth Cong. § 4 (2007) (attempting change to arbitration law).
159 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(l)-(2) (2007).
160 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(3) (2007) (describing "little or
no meaningful option" for consumers); Interview by Will Hinton with Representative Henry
Johnson Jr., Congressman, Georgia's Fourth Congressional District (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter
Johnson
Interview],
http://www.goodwillhinton.com/good will hinton-interviewsuscongressmanhankjohnson_g
a4th#part4 ("[1]n many consumer transactions, we have found big business is imposing these
contractual provisions on consumers often who do not know that these clauses are in the
agreements.").
161 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (proposing same
text in House of Representatives).
162 Johnson Interview, supra note 160.
163 See JOHN O'DONNELL,

THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES

ENSNARE CONSUMERS 3 (Laura MacCleery & Taylor Lincoln eds., Public Citizen 2007) (praising
AFA).
164 Senator Russell Feingold, United States Senate, Fact Sheet - The Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, http://feingold.senate.gov/issuesarbitration-fact.html.
165 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 93 1, 11 1th Cong. § 2(4) (2009) (articulating "repeat
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contention are consumer groups like Public Citizen, who contend that
arbitrators side with businesses ninety-four percent of the time.166
Proponents argue that the AFA is a fairer alternative because arbitration
cannot guarantee the procedural rights of a traditional courtroom due to
limitations on written findings, the discovery process and the lack of
openness and judicial review. 167 Public Citizen argues that fine-print,
boilerplate clauses in contracts of adhesion often bind consumers to
contracts not produced through fair and equal bargains. 168
However, the AFA has its fair share of critics as well. 169 The
United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) is particularly critical of
the legislation. 70 The Chamber supports pre-dispute arbitration clauses by
arguing that arbitration is quicker, cheaper and increases the chance of an
amicable resolution. 171 Moreover, the Chamber cites statistics of favorable2
decisions for consumers in more than seventy percent of arbitrations.
Finally, the Chamber even advances a political argument, asserting that

players" problem).
066
O'DONNELL, supra note 163, at 2 (outlining arguments for reforming consumer
protection). In credit card disputes with arbitrators, "94 percent of decisions were for business."
Id. Support for the AFA has come from many sources; according to Senator Feingold, "[a]
coalition of consumer and employment rights groups supports the measure. Included in the
coalition are Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of American [sic], Public Citizen, National
Consumer Coalition for Nursing Home Reform, American Association for Justice. National
Employment Lawyers Association, and National Association of Consumer Advocates."
Feingold, supra note 164.
167 O'DONNELL, supra note 163, at 4-5 (articulating procedural concerns with consumer
arbitration process); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111 th Cong. § 2 (describing other
problems with mandatory arbitration under FAA).
168 O'DONNELL, supra note 163, at 6 (explaining problem of fine print provisions).
169 See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (articulating opposition to AFA).
170 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Equal Employment Opportunities: Issues of Employment
Disputes, http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/labor/eeo.htm (opposing Senator Feingold's
AFA).
171 Id. (expressing Chamber's opposition to AFA). The Chamber declares:
The Chamber supports the right of employers and employees to enter into pre-dispute
binding arbitration agreements that obligate either party to resolve ... disputes through
arbitration as opposed to litigation .... Arbitration agreements have proven to be an
eflective means to resolving disputes and are typically quicker and less expensive than
litigation. Prohibiting binding arbitration would only continue to move more disputes
into courts, increase costs, anddecrease the chances of amicable settlement.
Id. (emphasis added).
172 Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President of Government Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, to Representatives Linda T. Sanchez, Chairwoman, & Chris Cannon,
Ranking Member, House of Representatives Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the
Comm. on the Judiciary (July 14, 2008) (on file with author) (opposing AFA).
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seventy-one percent of likely voters oppose the AFA.' 73 The Chamber
describes the bill as an 'attempted overhaul of the
arbitration system that is
' 4
being spearheaded by the trial lawyers' lobby."'
The AFA has the potential to become law in 2010 if President
Obama signs a version of the bill passed by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. 7 5 On July 15, 2008, the House version of
the AFA passed the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law, leaving only a vote in the full Judiciary Committee
17
before the entire House of Representatives could vote on the AFA. '
Despite its ninety-five cosponsors, the House version never faced a full
Judiciary Committee vote.1 77 Anticipating the end of the 110th Congress,
Representative Johnson promised to "reintroduce [the AFA] in the 111 th
Congress [and to] continue to fight to level the playing field between
consumers and [large business]."'' 78
Early in the
llth Congress,
Representative Johnson did reintroduce the bill on February 12, 2009, and
Senator Feingold reintroduced his version on April 29, 2009.179 Senator
Feingold's new version differed from the House version by including
arbitration of civil rights claims, which was in response to the Penn Plaza
case decided earlier that month. 180 If the 111th Congress passes the AFA,
some believe that President Obama supports and would sign this change in
federal arbitration law.' 81

I3Id. (citing statistics from U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform).
174 id.

See infif
notes 176-81 and accompanying text (describing developments on AFA).
Release, Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, U.S. House of Representatives,
Congresswoman Sanchez Welcomes Subcommittee Passage of Arbitration Reform Measures
(July 15, 2008) (on file with author) (announcing AFA subcommittee passage).
177 Johnson Interview, supra note 160 (articulating support for AFA in
110th Congress).
178 Id.
179 See generally Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111 th Cong. (2009) (proposing
AFA in 1 th Congress); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 Ith Cong. (2009)
(same).
180 Press Release, Senator Russell Feingold, U.S. Senate, Feingold Introduces Consumer
Justice Legislation (April 29, 2009) (on file with author) (explaining civil rights addition to
AFA).
M Posting of Bob
Lian
to
Washington
Labor
&
Employment
Wire,
http:/,\ashlaborwire.com (November 5, 2008, 17:56 EST) ("Obama will likely support this
dramatic overhaul of the [FAA] if it is reintroduced in the 1IIth Congress."); see also James E.
Berger & Victoria Lai, Congress Considers "Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,'" STAY CURRENT
(Paul Hastings, New York, NY), Mar. 19, 2009, at I (on file with author) (explaining changes if
President Obama signs the AFA).
175

176 Press
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V. CONCLUSION
The AFA would make the FAA inapplicable in consumer,
employment, franchise and civil rights claims. This change would restore
the FAA to its intended scope of only applying in commercial disputes.
The AFA would reconcile the policies of both Chapter 93A and the FAA.
The bill would effectively restore a fundamental aim of Chapter 93A and
its progeny that the FAA's expansion eroded. A fundamental aim of the
"little FTC" acts was to level the playing field between businesses and
consumers. Allowing businesses to unilaterally decide the forum for all
consumer claims runs contrary to this purpose. Failure to amend the
existing law would leave the problems of the boilerplate provisions and
"repeat players" unaddressed.
The AFA would allow businesses to
continue to agree with each other to use arbitration in advance, while
consumers would have the option to either use efficient, cost-effective
arbitration after their disputes arise or decide to proceed in court.
Although the AFA is one legislative option to level the playing the
field, there might be another approach. Some might argue that Congress
should allow the states to decide the effect of arbitration provisions on state
law claims. One may reasonably question the appropriateness of federal
law mandating the forum for determining state law claims in state court.
Whatever the merits of this alternative approach, there is no bill pending in
Congress that would let states decide this issue for themselves.
Matthew S. Furman

